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1 Introduction
Collaboration is a crucial aspect of academic research in many fields. This tendency is certainly more
prevalent in natural sciences, where a bulk of research projects are conducted by multiple researches.
The situation is, however, not far different in social sciences and especially in economics. A recent
tendency is that the number of collaborative works in economics increases rapidly and now occupies
a substantial portion of all published papers.1
There are presumably many reasons why researchers collaborate. From their viewpoint, though,
it ultimately comes down to how the amount of output is related to pecuniary (and sometimes non-
pecuniary) compensations such as job offers, tenures, grants, promotions and raises in base salary. To
illustrate this point, consider the world of no complementarity where writing one single-authored paper
requires exactly the same amount of energy as writing two coauthored papers (when collaborated by
two researchers). In this world, a ‘fair’ way to compensate is to count one single-authored paper
as equivalent to two coauthored papers. If two coauthored papers do count more heavily for some
reasons, self-interested researchers actually have an incentive to collaborate, just for their own sake.
Although it is difficult to verify this claim empirically, we take it rather uncontroversial that there
is a tendency to reward lengthy curriculum vitae in academics (or at least in economics), implying
that two coauthored papers indeed do count more heavily than one single-authored paper of identical
quality.2 Alternatively, this implies that researchers are given relatively low-powered incentives for
non-collaborative works conducted individually.
Given this, the question we need to ask at this juncture is why the compensation scheme in our
profession is designed in such a way that seems to encourage collaboration. An obvious reason for
this is perhaps the presence of complementarities: the contract designer (the principal) encourages
collaboration to reap the benefit of complementarities. Researchers can most likely benefit from
1See, for instance, Heck and Zaleski (1991), Hudson (1996) and Engers (1999) et al. Also, see Laband and Tollison
(2000) for the difference in the trend of collaboration between economics and biology.
2Due to the nature of the issue, empirical evidence on this is relatively sparse and hardly conclusive: for instance,
Sauer (1988) fails to reject that n coauthored papers (with n authors) counts more heavily than a single-authored paper
in determining salaries of academic ecnomists, using cross-section data. It is documented in survey data, however, that
universities do not typically fully discount collaborative work by the number of authors (McDowell and Smith, 1992).
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complementarities when a task requires various specialized skills. In this case, collaboration is valuable
as it realizes the efficient division of labor by allowing each participant to focus on narrowly defined
tasks. A benefit of collaboration may also arise even between researchers with a similar set of skills
because collaboration may lead to an idea none could have come up with individually.3 This effect
is more important when two or more specialists in the same fields work jointly, as we often observe
in economics. When the effect of complementarities is present, there arise potential benefits for the
contract designer to encourage collaboration since it leads to more output, given the same amount of
effort.
While this reasoning sounds fairly convincing, collaboration also poses a cumbersome problem
when each researcher’s effort is not directly observable, as is normally the case. Under collaboration,
observable signals of effort are more likely to become less sensitive to each researcher’s effort now
that they are also dependent on the collaborator’s effort as well. The cost of inducing effort from
each researcher naturally increases since each can free-ride on the collaborator’s effort. To justify the
compensation scheme which seems to encourage collaboration, the degree of complementarities in the
production process needs to be strong enough to compensate for the loss arising from the free-rider
problem: in fact, under plausible circumstances, the degree of complementarities needed to outweigh
this free-rider problem is fairly substantial. We argue that this is doubtful, especially in economics
where skill complementarities do not appear that critical.4 Indeed, empirical evidence on the effect of
collaboration on academic output in economics is mixed at best.5
Provided that the presence of complementarities alone does not necessarily justify the current
compensation scheme, we focus on another potential source of benefit, that is, each researcher’s
desire to maintain reputation in the academic community. The critical aspect of the model is that
collaboration allows researchers to work closely with each other and thus to observe what the contract
3This effect is often referred to as synergies to distinguish them from skill complementarities. In the paper, however,
we do not make any particular distinction between them.
4This may be in sharp contrast to natural sciences where the division of labor is clearer, compared to social sciences.
5McDowell and Smith (1992) finds no significant evidence that collaboration enhances productivity while Durden
and Perri (1995) finds evidence that collaboration indeed has a positive effect. Recently, using panel data, Hollis (2001)
shows that the effect of collaboration on output is even negative after discounting for the number of authors.
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designer cannot observe, namely each researcher’s effort level. Since no one would like to collaborate
with lazy and dishonest colleagues, each researcher has an additional motivation, absent when working
individually, to present himself as hard-working and honest. This motivation becomes stronger when
collaboration is so much more attractive for researchers: in this case, it can simply be too costly to
shirk and destroy a cooperative relationship with able colleagues. The contract designer can then
exploit this incentive to maintain reputation by offering low-powered incentives for non-collaborative
work in order to endogenously raise the cost of shirking.
To formalize this situation we consider a contracting situation in an infinitely repeated setting
under voluntary team formation. There is now a growing body of literature on so-called relational
contracts, which is an attempt to explicitly incorporate repeated interactions into the contract theory.6
The idea that the agents’ ability to monitor each other can be exploited by appropriately designing
compensation schemes is first pointed out and formulated by Che and Yoo (2001).7 This paper builds
on this framework and extends it to a situation under voluntary team formation. The situation we
will analyze in this paper is as follows. Consider a situation where a principal hires two agents and
lets them perform a task either individually or jointly. In each period, an opportunity to collaborate
arrives stochastically, but whether this opportunity has arrived is the agents’ private information. Not
knowing when collaboration is feasible, the principal cannot simply tell them when to collaborate; she
must instead provide incentives to collaborate when she wants them to by appropriately designing the
compensation scheme.
In this framework there arises a link between incentives for collaborative works and those for
non-collaborative works. Consider a trigger strategy where an agent’s defection leads to perpetual
retaliation by the other agent. The cost of defection is certainly small if each agent can earn sufficiently
large rents from non-collaborative works because he can always work individually. The principal then
has an incentive to offer low-powered incentives for non-collaborative works so that the agents cannot
earn sufficient rents from it. We identify conditions under which it is indeed optimal to offer this
6To name a few, Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994, 2002), Bernheim
and Whinston (1998), MacLeod (2003) and Levin (2003) explore the optimal form of contract in long-term relationships.
7Also, see Rayo (2003) and Ishida (2004) on team incentives in long-term relationships.
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type of contract under arbitrarily weak complementarities. We also show that this strategy is socially
inefficient and especially detrimental to the agents when the discount factor is near unity. This implies
that our desire to maintain reputation in the academic community may backfire and actually hurt us
when the compensation scheme is designed to take advantage of it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the basic environment.
Section 3 analyzes the static version of the model as a benchmark. Section 4 extends the analysis to
the repeated setting and show how the optimal compensation scheme from that in the static setting
and its effect on social welfare. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Consider a model with a principal (female) and two agents (male, i = A,B) in an infinitely repeated
setting. Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ T ≡ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. All parties are assumed to be risk
neutral. The common discount factor is given by δ ∈ (0, 1).
In each period, the principle lets A and B engage in a task. Each task is characterized by the
number of agents to work on the task, which we refer to as the mode of production. The mode
of production is denoted by superscript j ∈ {c, n} where j = c if the agents work jointly (c for
collaboration) and j = n if they work individually (n for non-collaboration).
An opportunity to collaborate arrives stochastically. With probability θ ∈ (0, 1), the opportunity
arrives and the agents must decide whether to take this opportunity and work jointly.8 The agents
can work jointly only if both of them agree to do so. The agents work individually if either (i) the
opportunity does not arrive or (ii) they fail to reach an agreement. Whether this opportunity has
arrived is the agents’ private information and cannot be observed by the principal.
8There are many potential interpretations for the parameter θ. One is to regard this as the probability of finding a
suitable collaborator. It is also possible to interpret this as the probability that the agents successfully come up with a
suitable research idea on which both of them can agree to collaborate.
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2.2 Production
In each period, each agent must exert costly effort to produce output. The effort choice is binary and
denoted by ei,t ∈ {0, 1}. The cost of effort is given by dei,t for non-collaborative work and γdei,t,
γ ∈ (0, 1), for collaborative work. The parameter γ measures the degree of complementarities in the
production process, and its effect disappears as γ → 1. The effort choice is not observable to the
principal.
The task is either successful or not, and its outcome is denoted by yi,t ∈ {0, 1}. For practical
purposes, yi,t can be interpreted as the number of publications per author in a given period.
9 When
the agents work individually, the probability of a success is given by
prob(yi,t = 1 | ei,t) = p1ei,t + p0(1− ei,t), p1 > p0 > 0.
The output of agent i thus depends solely on his own effort level. Define ∆p ≡ p1 − p0.
When the agents work jointly, on the other hand, the probability of a success is given by
prob(yi,t = y−i,t = 1 | ei,t, e−i,t) ≡ f(ei,t, e−i,t), i 6= −i.
For the analysis we consider a simple additive technology to emphasize that the only source of com-
plementarities is the difference in the cost of effort: f(1, 1) = p1, f(0, 0) = p0 and f(1, 0) = f(0, 1) =
0.5(p0 + p1). Under this specification, an agent’s marginal value of effort is independent of the other
agent’s effort level: that is,
f(1, 1)− f(0, 1) = f(1, 0)− f(0, 0) = 0.5∆p. (1)
In each period, the principal earns a private benefit V (yA,t+yB,t), depending on the outcome. Notice
that the principal simply values the number of publications per author so that there is no inherent
need to reward collaboration more heavily in this sense.
9That is, yi,t = 1 means either one single-authored publication (if agent i works individually) or two coauthored
publications (if he collaborates).
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2.3 Contract
The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agents in order to maximize the expected profit.10
The reservation payoff for both parties is assumed to be zero. Throughout the analysis, we focus on a
case where the contract offered initially applies for all subsequent periods. The principal can observe
the mode of production and the outcome of the task. There are thus four possible cases, and the
contract offered by the principal specifies the wage for each contingency. Let wj = (wj
0
, wj
1
), j = c, n,
denote a contract where wjy ∈ [0,∞) is the wage when the mode of production is j ∈ {c, n} and the
outcome is y ∈ {0, 1}: for expositional purposes we sometimes refer to wn as the individual contract
and to wc as the team contract. Also, let w = (wn
0
, wn
1
, wc
0
, wc
1
). Finally, there is a liquidity constraint
such that the principal must offer nonnegative wages.
Before we proceed further, we need to make an assumption concerning the possibility of ‘fake col-
laboration.’ Since the principal is unable to observe when collaboration is feasible, there is a possibility
that the agents claim to have engaged in collaboration even though they in fact worked individually.
This possibility may severely limit the effectiveness of a contract which rewards collaboration more
heavily. While it is conceptually possible, however, this behavior is a clear violation of a professional
code and we hence rule out this possibility at the outset. There are indeed several reasons why the
agents do not falsely pretend to collaborate. First, if there is some (possibly very small) probability
that fake collaboration is detected by the principal, and the potential penalty for such a violation
(in a broad sense) is very large, it is not beneficial to falsely pretend to collaborate. Second, there
may arise some psychological cost (or guilt) associated with being credited in a work that s/he has
nothing to do with. In any event, we do not believe that this (fake collaboration) is a serious problem
in the academic community, and we thus take the stance that there must be some mechanisms which
prevent researchers from falsely pretending to collaborate.
10In other words, we assume that the principal possesses full bargaining power.
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3 Static benchmark
We first consider a static version of the model as a benchmark. When the agents work individually,
each agent exerts effort if
p1w
n
1
+ (1− p1)w
n
0
− d ≥ p0w
n
1
+ (1− p0)w
n
0
. (2)
The incentive compatibility constraint for non-collaborative work is then given by
∆p(wn
1
− wn
0
) ≥ d. (3)
For expositional purposes, we say that a contract is high-powered if it induces effort from each agent;
on the other hand, we say that a contract is low-powered if it does not.
Now suppose that the agents choose to engage in collaboration. Taking the other agent’s effort
level e−i,t as given, each agent exerts effort if
f(1, e−i,t)w
c
1
+ (1− f(1, e−i,t))w
c
0
− γd ≥ f(0, e−i,t)w
c
1
+ (1− f(0, e−i,t))w
c
0
. (4)
The incentive compatibility constraint for collaborative work is then given by
(f(1, e−i,t)− f(0, e−i,t))(w
c
1
− wc
0
) = 0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
1
) ≥ γd. (5)
Given these, each agent must decide whether to collaborate with the other agent when the oppor-
tunity arrives. Let uj denote the expected stage-game payoff for each agent, conditional on the mode
of production. Upon the arrival of the opportunity, the agents agree to collaborate if uc ≥ un.
It is exceedingly tedious to completely characterize the optimal form of contract for a full range of
parameters without yielding much insight. We thus confine our attention to a subset of parameters
by the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 ∆pV ≥
d
∆p
.
Assumption 2 γ > 0.5.
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Assumption 1 indicates that effort is sufficiently valuable for the principal (d is sufficiently small
relative to V ) so that the optimal contract is always high-powered in the static setting. The assumption
also implies that it is efficient to exert effort. Assumption 2 is what we refer to as the condition of
weak complementarities, which limits the lower bound for γ. Under those assumptions we can state
the following result (the role of the assumptions will be made clearer in the proof of proposition 1).
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal static contract is given by
w = (0,
d
∆p
, 0, 0).
Proof: See Appendix.
It can be seen from above that it is more costly for the principal to induce effort when the
agents work jointly, because an agent can free-ride on the other agent’s effort. In other words, the
principal must offer more to induce any given level of effort because each agent’s payoff is now less
sensitive to his behavior when the agents work jointly. The proposition indicates that the principal
never encourages collaboration in the static setting unless the production process exhibits sufficiently
strong complementarities. The magnitude of complementarities may need to be quite substantial to
compensate for the loss arising from the free-riding problem. In the present setup, collaboration is
more profitable only when γ < 0.5.11
4 Collaboration through repeated interactions
4.1 Analysis
We now extend the analysis to a repeated setting and examine how the principal should modify the
compensation scheme to exploit the possibility of mutual monitoring between the agents. In the
repeated setting, the agents work closely with each other when they choose to work jointly. As a
11In the present setup, γ = 0.5 implies that writing four coauthored papers is equivalent to writing one single-authored
paper in terms of the amount of effort needed.
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consequence, there arises a possibility that the agents sustain mutual cooperation by adopting a type
of trigger strategy.
Suppose that collaboration allows each agent i to observe the other agent’s effort level e−i,t. Let
a history in period t be a sequence of observable effort choices (i.e., the other agent’s effort level
when they collaborate) up to period t − 1. Then, a strategy profile is a sequence of functions which
map from any possible history in each period into a probability distribution over effort choices in
that period.12 Within this framework, the equilibrium concept we adopt is similar to Che and Yoo
(2001): given some contract, the agents select an equilibrium which yields the highest total payoff
among all possible subgame perfect equilibria. Now define two states of the economy, S ∈ {C,N} and
consider the following trigger strategy. The economy is initially in state C until a defection occurs:
in state C, the agents always choose to exert effort whenever they work jointly (if the team contract
is high-powered). Once a defection occurs, the economy moves into state N where the agents simply
play the stage-game Nash equilibrium ever after. Taking this into account, each agent decides whether
to work jointly when the opportunity arrives.
First, even in the repeated setting, the incentive compatibility constraint for non-collaborative
works is unchanged because his choice of effort has no future implication under the trigger strategy
described above. This means that an agent exerts effort if ∆p(wn
1
− wn
0
) ≥ d.
The incentive compatibility constraint for collaborative works needs to be modified, on the other
hand, because the principal may exploit the agents’ ability of mutual monitoring sustained through
repeated interactions. Given this set of strategies, the expected payoff for each agent depends also on
the state of the economy. Let ucS denote the expected payoff for each agent in state S when the agents
choose to work jointly. Further, let US , S = C,N , denote the expected discounted sum of payoffs in
state S:
US =
1
1− δ
(θmax{un, ucS}+ (1− θ)u
n). (6)
12We thus do not consider strategies which depend on the history of outcomes yi,t.
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The incentive compatibility constraint for collaborative works in the repeated setting is then given by
f(1, e−i,t)w
c
1
+ (1− f(1, e−i,t))w
c
0
− γd+ δUC ≥ f(0, e−i,t)w
c
1
+ (1− f(0, e−i,t))w
c
0
+ δUN . (7)
With some algebra, this can be simplified to
0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) + δ(UC − UN ) ≥ γd, (8)
where
UC − UN =
θ
1− δ
(max{un, ucC} −max{u
n, ucN}). (9)
The incentive compatibility constraint for collaborative works is now weaker than in the static setting
as long as UC > UN . Note that the incentive compatibility constraint for collaborative works now
includes not only wc but also wn.
Given this, the agents must decide whether to collaborate when the opportunity arrives. The
condition for this is virtually the same as in the static setting, except that it is now dependent on the
state of the economy: in state S, the agents choose to work jointly if
ucS − u
n ≥ 0. (10)
Finally, when collaboration is preferred by the agents and the team contract is high-powered, the
contract must be collusion-proof to implement the desirable outcome as a team equilibrium:
p1w
c
1
+ (1− p1)w
c
0
− γd ≥ p0w
c
1
+ (1− p0)w
c
0
, (11)
p1w
c
1
+ (1− p1)w
c
0
− γd ≥ 0.5(p0 + p1)w
c
1
+ (1− 0.5(p0 + p1))w
c
0
− 0.5γd. (12)
These constraints assure that the agents as a team cannot be made better off by deviating from the
equilibrium. As it turns out, these constraints are identical and can be simplified to
wc
1
− wc
0
≥
γd
∆p
. (13)
We now investigate whether there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to
offer a contract which encourages collaboration. There are generically three distinct types of contract
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that the principal can offer in this situation: (i) only the individual contract is high-powered; (ii) both
of the contracts are high-powered; (iii) only the team contract is high-powered.13 In what follows we
explore each case in turn.
Type 1: Only the individual contract is high-powered
Consider a case where the principal offers a high-powered individual contract combined with a
low-powered team contract. This is the case if
∆p(wn
1
− wn
0
) ≥ d and γd > 0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) + δ(UC − UN ).
We denote the expected profit that the principal earns from each agent in this case by pihl. If u
n > ucC ,
the expected profit per agent is given by
pihl = p1(V − w
n
1
)− (1− p1)w
n
0
. (14)
Note that if the team contract is low-powered, no peer sanction mechanism can function because
ucC = u
c
N = p0w
c
1
+ (1− p0)w
c
0
. This implies that UC = UN and the problem is simply reduced to its
static version. The optimal contract in this case is exactly as described in proposition 1. The next
result directly follows from proposition 1 (the proof abbreviated).
Lemma 1 Consider a class of contracts in which only the individual contract is high-powered. Under
Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal contract within this class is given by
w = (0,
d
∆p
, 0, 0).
Type 2: Both of the contracts are high-powered
We now consider a case where both of the contracts are high-powered, i.e.,
∆p(wn
1
− wn
0
) ≥ d and 0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) + δ(UC − UN ) ≥ γd.
We denote the expected profit in this case by pihh. If u
c
C ≥ u
n, the expected profit per agent is given
by
pihh = θ(p1(V − w
c
1
)− (1− p1)w
c
0
) + (1− θ)(p1(V − w
n
1
)− (1− p1)w
n
0
)
13Under the maintained assumptions we can rule out the possibility that both of the contracts are low-powered.
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= p1(V − θw
c
1
− (1− θ)wn
1
)− (1− p1)(θw
c
0
+ (1− θ)wn
0
). (15)
Lemma 2 Consider a class of contracts in which both of the contracts are high-powered. Under
Assumptions 1 and 2, (i) if 2δθ(1−γ) > (1−δ)(2γ−1), the optimal contract within this class is given
by
w = (0,
d
∆p
, 0, α(γ, δ, θ)
d
∆p
),
where
α(γ, δ, θ) ≡
2γ(1− δ + δθ)∆p+ 2δθp0
(1− δ)∆p+ 2δθp1
;
(ii) if not, the optimal contract is given by
w = (0,
d
∆p
, 0, β(γ, δ, θ)
d
∆p
),
where
β(γ, δ, θ) ≡
2γ(1− δ + δθ)
1− δ + 2δθ
.
Proof: See Appendix.
If 2δθ(1 − γ) ≤ (1 − δ)(2γ − 1), β(γ, δ, θ) ≥ 1 so the type 2 contract is always dominated by the
type 1 contract. This indicates that 2δθ(1 − γ) > (1 − δ)(2γ − 1) is the necessary condition for the
type 2 contract to be optimal. Note that this necessary condition is satisfied when δ is sufficiently
close to unity.
Type 3: Only the team contract is high-powered
Finally, we consider a case where only the team contract is high-powered, i.e.,
0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) + δ(UC − UN ) ≥ γd and d > ∆p(w
n
1
− wn
0
).
As above, we denote the expected profit per agent in this case by pilh where
pilh = θ(p1(V − w
c
1
)− (1− p1)w
c
0
) + (1− θ)(p0(V − w
n
1
)− (1− p0)w
n
0
). (16)
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Lemma 3 Consider a class of contracts in which only the team contract is high-powered. Under
Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal contract within this class is given by
w = (0, 0, 0, β(γ, δ, θ)
d
∆p
).
Proof: See Appendix.
4.2 The optimal form of contract in the repeated setting
With those results we are now ready to determine the optimal form of contract in the repeated
setting. Under the maintained assumptions, in the static setting, the optimal individual contract is
high-powered while the optimal team contract is low-powered. We now show that this conclusion does
not necessarily hold in the repeated setting. To illustrate this point, we confine our attention to a
limiting case where δ → 1. In this case we can show the following.
Proposition 2 (Collaboration under Weak Complementarities) In the limiting case where δ → 1, the
optimal team contract is necessarily high-powered.
Proof: See Appendix.
Collaboration is more profitable for the principal if and only if wc
1
< wn
1
. As δ → 1, this condition
becomes
lim
δ→1
α(γ, δ, θ) =
γp1 + (1− γ)p0
p1
< 1, (17)
lim
δ→1
β(γ, δ, θ) = γ < 1. (18)
This indicates that in the limiting case, the degree of complementarities needed to make collaboration
more profitable can be arbitrarily small: that is, collaboration can be more profitable under arbitrarily
weak complementarities. Conversely, though, it is also true that the presence of complementarities is
necessary to make collaboration profitable while its magnitude can be arbitrarily small.
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Given this result, the principal is now left with two alternatives, either type 2 or type 3. Equiva-
lently, the question comes down to whether the optimal individual contract should be high-powered.
While the optimal individual contract is high-powered in the static setting by design, we show that
this conclusion may be overturned in the repeated setting.
Proposition 3 In the limiting case, there exists some θ¯ such that the optimal individual contract is
low-powered for all θ ∈ [θ¯, 1)
Proof: See Appendix.
The proposition indicates that there exists a situation where the optimal individual contract is
low-powered as long as: (i) the agents are sufficiently patient so that they have vested interests in
maintaining their reputation; and (ii) the opportunity to collaborate arrives sufficiently frequently.
The result is reasonably intuitive. First, the peer sanction mechanism is more effective when the agents
care more about the future. An extreme case is the static setting (δ = 0) where there is no room for
the effect of the peer sanction mechanism to take place. Second, the frequency of the opportunity
to collaborate also plays an important role on two accounts. On one hand, the more frequently
the opportunity arrives, the more the agents lose by defecting and thus destroying a cooperative
relationship with the collaborator. The peer sanction mechanism is hence more effective when θ is
sufficiently large. On the other hand, the cost of offering low-powered incentives for non-collaborative
work monotonically decreases as the agents can collaborate more frequently. One can then certainly
argue that an expansion in the size of the profession facilitates collaboration (an increase in θ), which
in turn accelerates the tendency to reward lengthy curriculum vitae.14
4.3 Welfare
We now examine the effect of infinitely repeated interactions on social welfare. In general, one cannot
assert whether the optimal dynamic contract promotes efficiency compared to its static counterpart.
14As for the increase in the number of collaborative works, Hudson (1996) raises three potential reasons for the recent
increase in the number of collaborative works. One of them is the recent growth of the size of the profession.
14
In either case, an inefficiency may possibly arise but for different reasons.
Under the maintained payoff structure, it is socially efficient to (i) induce effort in all periods, and
(ii) engage in collaboration whenever possible (because of complementarities γ < 1). First, consider
the optimal static contract. Under the optimal static contract, the agents always exert effort, and it is
socially efficient in this sense. Under the maintained assumptions, however, the optimal static contract
does not encourage collaboration, which entails efficiency losses. The optimal static contract fails to
achieve the socially efficient outcome because of the free-rider problem. Since the observable signal is
now less sensitive to each agent’s behavior, an agent can free-ride on the other agent’s effort, and the
cost of inducing effort necessarily increases for collaborative work. Under plausible circumstances, this
additional cost of inducing effort outweighs the benefit from collaboration: in this case, the principal
chooses to let the agents work individually even when it is socially efficient to let them work jointly.
Now consider the optimal dynamic contract. In the repeated setting, the socially efficient outcome
is achieved when type (ii) is optimal: in this case, repeated interactions allow the principal to overcome
the free-rider problem. When both δ and θ are sufficiently close to unity, however, only the team
contract is high-powered. Apparently, this type of contract fails to implement the first-best effort
when the opportunity to collaborate does not arrive. This inefficiency (the failure to induce effort for
non-collaborative works) stems from the principal’s incentive to make the peer sanction mechanism
more effective, contrary to the case of the optimal static contract where the inefficiency arises from
the free-rider problem. This indicates that the current compensation scheme in our profession, which
seems to reward collaboration more heavily, may be socially inefficient because it fails to provide
proper incentives to induce the first-best effort for non-collaborative works. The following conclusion
is immediately obtained from proposition 3.
Proposition 4 In the limiting case, the optimal contract in the repeated setting is socially efficient
if and only if θ ∈ (0, θ¯).
Note also that the effect of infinitely repeated interactions on the agents’ welfare is ambiguous. To
see this, define Uhl, Uhh and Ulh as the agent’s expected payoff under the type 1, 2 and 3 contract
15
respectively. First, when only the individual contract is high-powered, we obtain
Uhl = p1w
n
1
− d =
p0d
∆p
. (19)
This is the agent’s expected payoff when δ is sufficiently small, and hence the expected payoff in the
static setting. As δ approaches unity, either the type 2 or 3 contract emerges as the optimal contract.
When both of the contracts are high-powered, the expected payoff is
Uhh = θ(p1w
c
1
− γd) + (1− θ)(p1w
n
1
− d)
= θ
(
p1α(γ, δ, θ)
d
∆p
− γd
)
+ (1− θ)
p0d
∆p
. (20)
if 2δθ(1 − γ) ≤ (1 − δ)(2γ − 1). We can show that the agents are made better off under the type 2
contract than under the type 1 contract, i.e., Uhh ≥ Uhl. This condition can be written as
p1α(γ, δ, θ)
d
∆p
− γd ≥
p0d
∆p
, (21)
which is further simplified to
α(γ, δ, θ) ≥
γp1 + (1− γ)p0
p1
. (22)
It is straightforward to verify that this condition holds when γ > 0.5 as assumed. The expected payoff
is monotonically decreasing in δ and converges to that in the static setting Uhl as δ → 1.
Finally, when only the team contract is high-powered, the expected payoff in the limiting case is
Ulh = θ(p1w
c
1
− γd)
= θ
(
p1β(γ, δ, θ)
d
∆p
− γd
)
. (23)
In this case, the agents may or may not be made better off. When δ is sufficiently close to unity,
however, they are made strictly worse off since limδ→1 β(γ, δ, θ) = γ. In this sense, the agents’ desire
to maintain reputation may backfire and actually be detrimental to them. The agents suffer in the
repeated setting for two reasons. First, they suffer because the principal needs to offer less to induce
effort for collaborative work because she can effectively exploit the agents’ ability to monitor each
other in the repeated setting. Second, they also suffer because they are given high-powered incentives
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only for collaborative works, but there is a positive probability that the opportunity to collaborate
does not arrive. We summarize this result as follows.
Proposition 5 In the limiting case, if θ ∈ [θ¯, 1), the agents are made strictly worse off in the repeated
setting than in the static setting.
5 Conclusion
The paper examines the optimal provision of incentives under voluntary team formation. When collab-
oration allows the agents to mutually monitor each other, the principal may benefit from encouraging
collaboration even in the absence of strong productive complementarities. Moreover, under certain
conditions, it is optimal to offer low-powered incentives for non-collaborative works as it makes the
peer sanction mechanism more effective. We argue that seemingly low-powered incentives offered for
non-collaborative works, as often observed in our profession, can be seen as a critical ingredient of
optimal incentive schemes. While our model simply aims at providing an alternative view and is by
no means to exclude other potential explanations, we believe that the desire to maintain reputation
is critical for academic researchers and the current compensation scheme is a fairly effective way to
exploit this desire.
As a final note, there are several unresolved issues that need to be settled. One possibility is to
consider the case with multiple principals who independently design compensation schemes. Although
the extension does not completely alter the nature of the problem as long as agents are not completely
mobile, it certainly makes the problem more complicated since this may allow us to endogenize the
probability with which an opportunity to collaborate arrives. A natural way to model this is that
the probability is an increasing function of the number of principals offering a high-powered team
contract. It is expected that there arises a type of strategic complementarity among the principals
because it is certainly not a good idea to offer a low-powered individual contract when others offer a
high-powered individual contract and hence not many agents are willing to collaborate. With multiple
principals, competition among them also becomes an issue.
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Another potential avenue to extend the current analysis is to allow for more than two agents.
For instance, it is more realistic to construct a model where there are many agents and each agent
searches for a potential collaborator in a search environment. This type of setup may require some
sort of community enforcement, in the sense of Kandori (1992), to make the peer sanction mechanism
effective. In this context it naturally becomes crucial how each agent can establish (or tarnish) his
reputation or alternatively how the information spreads out in the community when a defection occurs.
The peer sanction mechanism is expected to be weak if there are many agents (so that the likelihood
of meeting the same agent is negligible) and the information transmission is rather slow. On the other
hand, the peer sanction mechanism can be highly effective if each of us belongs to a small community
(a guild) from which to choose potential collaborators and the information is immediately shared
within the community. In future it is of some interest to pursue this possibility.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We first examine the optimal individual contract. It is immediate to
see wn
0
= 0. It also follows from (3) that the optimal individual contract takes one of the two forms:
wn
1
= d/∆p, or wn
1
= 0. If the principal offers the high-powered contract wn
1
= d/∆p, the expected
profit is p1(V − d/∆p); if she offers the low-powered contract w
n
1
= 0, it is p0V . The principal thus
chooses the high-powered contract if
∆pV ≥
d
∆p
. (24)
Under Assumption 1, therefore, it is optimal for the principal to offer the high-powered individual
contract.
We now shift our attention to the optimal team contract and see whether it can improve upon
the optimal individual contract. To this end, we first show that the low-powered team contract
can never yield more profit than the high-powered individual contract under Assumption 1. Note
first that wc
0
= 0. Given this, if wc
1
= 0, the expected profit is p0V . It then follows directly from the
argument above that the low-powered team contract cannot improve upon the high-powered individual
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contract. Now consider the high-powered team contract wc
1
= γd/∆f(1). Under this contract, the
expected profit is p1(V − γd/∆f(1)). The team contract improves upon the individual contract if
p1
(
V −
2γd
∆p
)
≥ p1
(
V −
d
∆p
)
, (25)
which never holds under Assumption 2. This indicates that the principal should never encourage
collaboration: one of the team contracts that can achieve this is wc = (0, 0) while there are certainly
many others.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Before we proceed, we first conjecture that 0.5∆p(wc
1
−wc
0
) < γd so that it is
stage-game Nash equilibrium to exert no effort for collaborative works, i.e., ucN = p0w
c
1
+ (1− p0)w
c
0
.
For the high-powered team contract to be meaningful, it is also necessary that the agents choose to
collaborate in state C when they can, i.e., ucC ≥ u
n. We suppose for now that these conditions hold
and later verify that this is indeed the case. The incentive compatibility constraint for collaborative
works is then given by
0.5∆p(wc
1
−wc
0
)+
δθ
1− δ
(p1w
c
1
+(1−p1)w
c
0
−γd−max{p1w
n
1
+(1−p1)w
n
0
−d, p0w
c
1
+(1−p0)w
c
0
}) ≥ γd.
(26)
Provided that the individual contract is high-powered, it is immediate to see wn
0
= 0 and wn
1
= d/∆p.
The constraint can be written as
0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) +
δθ
1− δ
(p1w
c
1
+ (1− p1)w
c
0
− γd−max{p1
d
∆p
− d, p0w
c
1
+ (1− p0)w
c
0
}) ≥ γd. (27)
There are two distinct situations we need to consider: (Case 1) p1d/∆p− d > p0w
c
1
+ (1− p0)w
c
0
and
(Case 2) p1d/∆p− d ≤ p0w
c
1
+ (1− p0)w
c
0
. We now examine each case in turn.
(Case 1): Suppose that p1d/∆p−d > p0w
c
1
+(1−p0)w
c
0
, which means that the agents never collaborate
in state N . Under this condition, the constraint now becomes
0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) +
δθ
1− δ
(p1w
c
1
+ (1− p1)w
c
0
− γd− p1
d
∆p
+ d) ≥ γd. (28)
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We first show wc
0
= 0. To show this, suppose that the optimal team contract is given by wc = (a, b)
where a > 0. Note, however, that another contract wc = (0, (p1b + (1 − p1)a)/p1) yields the same
profit level and satisfies the constraint with strict inequality. This is a contradiction and we can thus
conclude wc
0
= 0. Given this result, the constraint can be simplified to
0.5∆pwc
1
+
δθ
1− δ
(p1w
c
1
− γd− p1
d
∆p
+ d) ≥ γd. (29)
Solving this constraint, we obtain a candidate team contract
wc
0
= 0, wc
1
=
2γ(1− δ + δθ)∆p+ 2δθp0
(1− δ)∆p2 + 2δθp1∆p
d. (30)
To show that this contract implements the desired outcome, it is necessary that (i) γd > 0.5∆pwc
1
and (ii) ucC ≥ u
n, i.e., p1w
c
1
−γd ≥ p1w
n
1
. It is straightforward to see that the first condition is always
satisfied when γ > 0.5. The second condition can be written as
p1
2γ(1− δ + δθ)∆p+ 2δθp0
(1− δ)∆p2 + 2δθp1∆p
d− γd ≥ p1
d
∆p
− d =
p0d
∆p
, (31)
which is reduced to
p1
2γ(1− δ + δθ)∆p+ 2δθp0
(1− δ)∆p+ 2δθp1
≥ γp1 + (1− γ)p0. (32)
With some algebra, one can show that this condition is always satisfied when γ > 0.5.
The optimal team contract must also satisfy p1d/∆p − d > p0w
c
1
, which can also be written as
d/∆p > wc
1
. This holds if
1 >
2γ(1− δ + δθ)∆p+ 2δθp0
(1− δ)∆p+ 2δθp1
, (33)
which is further simplified to
2δθ(1− γ) > (1− δ)(2γ − 1). (34)
Finally, we need to show that the candidate contract is collusion-proof, i.e.,
∆pwc
1
≥ γd. (35)
This condition can be written as
2γ(1− δ + δθ)∆p+ 2δθp0
(1− δ)∆p+ 2δθp1
≥ γ. (36)
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With some algebra, one can show that this condition always holds. This implies that if (34) is satisfied,
the optimal team contract within this class is given by (30).
(Case 2): Now suppose that p1d/∆p − d ≤ p0w
c
1
+ (1 − p0)w
c
0
, which means that the agents choose
to collaborate even in state N . Provided that 0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) < γd, the incentive compatibility
constraint for collaborative works becomes
0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) +
δθ
1− δ
(p1w
c
1
+ (1− p1)w
c
0
− γd− p0w
c
1
− (1− p0)w
c
0
) ≥ γd. (37)
This condition can further be written as
0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) +
δθ
1− δ
(∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
)− γd) ≥ γd. (38)
Solving this we obtain
wc
1
− wc
0
≥
2γ(1− δ + δθ)d
(1− δ + 2δθ)∆p
, (39)
which implies wc
0
= 0.
To show that this contract implements the desired outcome, it is necessary that (i) γd > 0.5∆pwc
1
and (ii) ucC ≥ u
n, i.e., p1w
c
1
− γd ≥ p1w
n
1
− d. It is immediate to see that the first condition is always
satisfied. Note also that
2γ(1− δ + δθ)
1− δ + 2δθ
≥ 1, (40)
when 2δθ(1− γ) ≤ (1− δ)(2γ − 1). This implies that the second condition is also satisfied.
The optimal team contract must also satisfy p1d/∆p − d ≤ p0w
c
1
+ (1 − p0)w
c
0
, which can be
simplified to
wc
1
≥
d
∆p
. (41)
Note that this condition always holds when 2δθ(1− γ) ≤ (1− δ)(2γ− 1). It follows from this that the
candidate contract is given by
wc
0
= 0, wc
1
=
2γ(1− δ + δθ)d
(1− δ + 2δθ)∆p
, (42)
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if 2δθ(1− γ) ≤ (1− δ)(2γ − 1).
Finally, it directly follows from (41) that this candidate contract is also collusion-proof, i.e., ∆pwc
1
≥
γd. This implies that if (34) is not satisfied, the optimal team contract within this class is given by
(42).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: As above, we first conjecture (i) 0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) < γd and (ii) ucC ≥ u
n.
Given these, the incentive compatibility constraint for collaborative works becomes
0.5∆p(wc
1
−wc
0
)+
δθ
1− δ
(p1w
c
1
+(1−p1)w
c
0
−γd−max{p0w
n
1
+(1−p0)w
n
0
, p0w
c
1
+(1−p0)w
c
0
}) ≥ γd. (43)
If the individual contract is low-powered, there is no reason to offer a positive wage for non-
collaborative works, implying wn
0
= wn
1
= 0 and un = 0. The incentive compatibility constraint then
becomes
0.5∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
) +
δθ
1− δ
(∆p(wc
1
− wc
0
)− γd) ≥ γd, (44)
which leads to
wc
1
− wc
0
≥
2(1− δ + δθ)γd
(1− δ + 2δθ)∆p
. (45)
The candidate contract is thus given by
wc
0
= 0, wc
1
=
2(1− δ + δθ)γd
(1− δ + 2δθ)∆p
, (46)
which indeed satisfies γd > 0.5∆pwc
1
for any (δ, θ) ∈ (0, 1)2 as conjectured. It is also immediate to see
that ucC ≥ u
n = 0.
Finally, we need to verify that the candidate contract is collusion-proof, i.e.,
∆pwc
1
=
2(1− δ + δθ)γd
1− δ + 2δθ
≥ γd, (47)
which can be simplified to
2(1− δ + δθ) ≥ 1− δ + 2δθ. (48)
Since this evidently holds, the optimal team contract within this class is given by (46).
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove the proposition it suffices to show pihh > pihl when δ is arbitrar-
ily close to unity. It follows from lemma 2 that as δ → 1, the optimal contract is (0, d/∆p, 0, α(γ, δ, θ)d)
when both of the contracts are high-powered. Note that
lim
δ→1
α(γ, δ, θ) =
γ∆p+ p0
p1
. (49)
This implies that as δ → 1,
pihh = p1
(
V − θ
γ∆p+ p0
p1∆p
d− (1− θ)
d
∆p
)
. (50)
Note also that the expected profit under the type 1 contract is independent of δ:
pihl = p1
(
V −
d
∆p
)
. (51)
Given p0 > 0, it is immediate to see pihh > pihl as δ → 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The optimal individual contract is low-powered if pilh ≥ pihh. Notice
that
lim
δ→1
β(γ, δ, θ) = γ. (52)
As δ → 1, pilh ≥ pihh if
θp1
(
V −
γd
∆p
)
≥ p1
(
V − θ
γ∆p+ p0
p1∆p
d− (1− θ)
d
∆p
)
, (53)
which is reduced to
θ(1− γ)p0d+ (1− θ)p1d
p1∆p
≥ (1− θ)V. (54)
It is easy to see that this condition holds as θ → 1.
Q.E.D.
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